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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of an investment subsidy program for small
and medium-sized enterprises in Flanders from 2004 to 2009. The subsidies were
awarded according to a ranking system that favored young, growing and produc-
tive firms with a strong cash flow, granting subsidies to the highest scoring firms
until the depletion of funds. The nature of this allocation system creates a sharp
cut off in granting the subsidy according to the score, allowing us to estimate the
causal impact of the subsidies using a regression discontinuity design. We find a
positive effect on firm-level investment, employment, output and productivity for
the firms that were granted the subsidy, but only for the small firms. However,
the effect is small relative to the cost of the subsidy.
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1 Introduction
Despite the high amounts of state aid spent to support private business initiatives,1 the
evaluations of the effectiveness of state aid are relatively rare. There is no consensus
among academics on whether state aid is a suitable tool to fuel economic activity. The
basic evaluation problem is that government programs might simply finance activities
that firms would have undertaken in the absence of industrial policy, as noted in
Criscuolo et al. (2012). Because of the difficulty to determine a plausible counter-factual
of receiving state aid, it is inherently difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of state
aid, see Rodrik (2012). This applies as well to our context of investment subsidies in
Flanders. If the subsidies are targeted towards firms that would have invested anyway, a
simple comparison between firms that received subsidies and firms that did not receive
subsidies is likely to overstate the effect of the subsidies. To estimate a causal effect of
the subsidies, we need to control for this selection effect.
The subsidies we investigate were issued by the Flemish government between 2004
and 2009 to firms across all sectors to stimulate investment and economic growth. To
this end, the Flemish government awarded approximately AC250M of subsidies in total to
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To award the subsidy, the government set
up a total of 16 call systems, where firms could apply for a subsidy with an investment
project. Each project was scored according to a transparent process with pre-determined
and openly communicated criteria. The criteria favored firms that are young, fast
growing in terms of employment and well-performing in terms of labor productivity,
cash flow, use of own funds in the investment and other measures. The highest scoring
applications were granted the subsidy, until the funds are depleted.
In this paper, we exploit the quasi-experimental setting of the subsidy, introduced by
the sharp cut off of the call systems: firms that score below the cut off are not granted
the subsidy, only firms above the cut off are granted the subsidy. This allows us to
make use of the ’regression discontinuity design’ (RDD) methodology (Lee and Lemieux,
2010; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014). Our main assumption is that firms that scored just
below the cut off are a good counter-factual for firms just above the cut off. Thus, we
can estimate a ’local average treatment effect’ (LATE) around the cut off. The goal
of our paper is to estimate the causal effect of the subsidy on our variables of interest:
1According to the State Aid Scoreboard of the European Commission, the total non-crisis state
aid in the EU27 member states was AC67B in 2012, or 0.52% of GDP. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/state_aid/scoreboard/non_crisis_en.html
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investment, employment, output and productivity. The results help the policy maker in
evaluating whether the subsidy program induced a higher firm growth and productivity
for firms that received the subsidy. The LATE around the cut off is an interesting
parameter in this context, as the cut off is the point where we would expect the highest
effect. The subsidy call system favors firms that use more of their own funds in the
investment and have higher cash flows. Consequently, we would expect the firms with
the best score to face the lowest credit constraints and so crowding out of investments
can expected to be high for these firms. Firms at the cut off have the lowest score of the
firms that received the subsidy, so crowding out can be lower for these. An evaluation of
the LATE tells the policy maker whether there was a causal effect of the subsidy, and
consequently whether it would be useful to expand the budget for the subsidy in the
future.
Our data consists of two main sources. The data of the subsidy, provided by the
Flemish government, contains information on the firms, the requested subsidy, the score
of the project and whether the subsidy was granted or not. We merge this data with the
standard accounting data, containing yearly information on employment, capital stock
and output. Our methodology and data are close to the work of Cerqua and Pellegrini
(2014) who investigate the effect of subsidies in Italy.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. Our paper is one of the only papers to
exploit a quasi-experimental setting in evaluating the effectiveness of general investment
subsidies. In addition, we apply the setting to an economically relatively well performing
region, namely Flanders, with a steady annual regional GDP growth of over 3% from
2003 to 2009 and very limited regional differences in wealth.2 Most other papers applying
a quasi-experimental setting, such as Criscuolo et al. (2012) on the regional selective
assistance program for development and intermediate areas in the UK and Cerqua and
Pellegrini (2014) on Law 488 in the South of Italy, tend to focus on development areas.
Our results indicate that the causal effect of the subsidies on the growth of the
receiving firms was rather limited. We find a positive effect on investment, sales, value
added, employment and productivity, but statistically significant only for the small
firms, e.g. firms with less than 10 employees. For larger firms we do not find any effect.
The results are robust to various specifications. Possible explanations for the limited
effect on larger firms include the low subsidy amount and the selection criteria to award
2Flanders has 5 provinces, which exhibit only mild differences in income per capita: the lowest
income per capita was still 82% of the highest income per capita in 2009.
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the subsidy. The subsidy as a percentage of the corresponding investment was rather
low, possibly too low to have a measurable effect.3 In addition, firms were selected on
having a high cash flow and using own funds for investment, which favors firms that
can do the investment anyway. Interestingly, the result that the impact of the subsidy
only exists or is stronger for small firms is in line with Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014),
Criscuolo et al. (2012) and Bronzini and Iachini (2014). This is often explained by the
more difficult access of smaller firms to private funds, as explicitly modelled in Wren
(1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the literature on state aid as well as some background on the subsidy. Section 3
explains the data and section 4 presents the methodology in detail. The results together
with robustness checks, are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents some additional
results. We conclude in section 7.
2 Literature review and the investment subsidy
2.1 Literature Review
There is little consensus among academics regarding the effectiveness of state aid.
Government programs might simply finance activities that firms would have undertaken
in the absence of industrial policy (Criscuolo et al., 2012). Another often used argument
against interventionism is that the government is unlikely to better assess the chances
of commercial success more effectively than the market (Aghion et al., 2011). However,
there are also strong arguments in favor of state aid. In general, state aid can be useful to
mitigate externalities, such as knowledge spillovers or environmental damage. Another
factor to consider is the existence of capital market imperfections and credit constraints,
which can be alleviated by a targeted state aid policy. Aghion et al. (2015) argue that
state aid is beneficial as long as it is adequately targeted and properly governed. They
provide theoretical and empirical support in favor of a policy that is de-concentrated,
not favoring one particular firm. They show that the degree of competition in a sector
has a positive effect on the increase of total factor productivity for industrial policy
targeted towards Chinese firms. Also a more spread-out subsidy over many firms within
a sector has a positive effect on productivity.
3The subsidy as % of total investment was generally around 10% for most applications, see the
data section for more details on the maximum %.
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Even when the subsidy is effective in increasing investment and thus increases the
scale of operation, the effect on employment could be negative. If labor and capital
are complementary, an increase in capital will also induce an increase in labor. But if
they are substitutes, firms will substitute capital for labor when the cost of capital is
reduced through subsidies. Consequently, the subsidy could potentially decrease labor,
depending on whether the scale effect or the substitution effect is the largest.4
Few papers estimate a causal effect of industrial policy targeted towards subsidizing
investment and employment. The main reason is that it is inherently difficult to estimate
a causal effect. Simply comparing subsidized firms with non-subsidized firms causes a
positive bias in the estimated effect if the subsidies are targeted towards investments
that would have happened anyway. If industrial policy is targeted towards the firms
that struggle to survive and thus invest less anyway, a negative bias of the estimated
effect would occur in a simple OLS regression (Rodrik, 2012).
Before firm-level data became widely available, studies focused on sectoral-level data,
see e.g. Daly et al. (1993) on Canada and Schalk and Untiedt (2000) on Germany. More
recent papers focus on firm-level data. However, the programs investigated are generally
not discretionary, so it is difficult to estimate the appropriate counterfactual. Therefore,
an alternative is to take a descriptive approach, as done by Harris and Robinson (2005)
who investigated the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) program in the UK. Other
papers mitigate this issue by controlling for observables (e.g. Bergstro¨m, 2000; Koski
and Pajarinen, 2013; Bia and Mattei, 2012, respectively for Swedish firms between 1987
and 1993, Finnish firms between 2003 and 2008 and Piedmont firms between 2001 and
2003), limiting the control group to firms that were eligible but did not apply (Harris
and Trainor, 2005, for Northern Ireland using plant-level data from 1983-1997), or using
a matching on observables approach (e.g. Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011; Bondonio and
Greenbaum, 2012, respectively for Italy over the period 1996-2004 and Piedmont from
2000 to 2003). Also Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) use matching on observables
to mitigate endogeneity issues in the context of Flemish R&D subsidies. Gonza´lez
et al. (2005) take a distinct approach, estimating a model of firms’ decisions about
performing R&D when government support can be expected and use Spanish survey
data in the 1990s to explore the effects of R&D subsidies. Some papers try to get closer
to a causal effect by using an RDD approach related to ours. Bronzini and de Blasio
4For a more detailed discussion on the conditions that determine whether subsidies increase or
decrease employment in a standard production function framework with perfect competition in all
markets, see Criscuolo et al. (2012).
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(2006) investigate a similar setting as ours in Italy for the ’Law 488’ program. They use
the rejected firms as a control group and also include specifications where they limit
the sample to firms that are in the middle of the ranking. The paper by Cerqua and
Pellegrini (2014) investigates the same program for a longer time period and uses a
multiple RDD approach. Bronzini and Iachini (2014) use RDD in a context of R&D
subsidies for Italy (the ’Law no. 7/2002, art. 4’ program), while Jacob and Lefgren
(2011) focus on the impact of National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants in the US
on subsequent publications and citations. Criscuolo et al. (2012) use an instrumental
variable approach instead, exploiting exogenous changes in eligibility of the different
regions for the RSA program in the UK.
The results show a remarkable resemblance: the papers that take firm size hetero-
geneity into account, find an effect on investment that either only exists for small firms
(Criscuolo et al., 2012; Bronzini and Iachini, 2014) or a positive effect across all firm sizes
but higher for small firms (Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011;
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Gonza´lez et al., 2005). The effect on productivity
is mixed: most papers do not find an effect on productivity (Cerqua and Pellegrini,
2014; Criscuolo et al., 2012; Bergstro¨m, 2000) with some exceptions who find a positive
(Harris and Robinson, 2005) or negative effect (Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011).
In most countries, the subsidy granted relative to the investment was quite substantial
in the context of investment programs. For the Law 488 program in Italy it was up
to 50% in specific regions and 20% in other regions (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006).
The RSA progam in the UK allowed for a maximum investment subsidy of 20-30%,
depending on the region (Criscuolo et al., 2012). In Northern Ireland it was 45% (Harris
and Trainor, 2005). For Finland in the period 2001-2003, subsidy spending was up to
50% for some specific projects 5 and up to 10-30% for small firms and 5-20% for medium
sized firms (Tokila and Haapanen, 2012).
Other papers investigate related topics. Ham et al. (2011) find positive effects on
local labor markets from government programs that encourage employment development
in disadvantaged areas in the US. Devereux et al. (2007) find that the RSA discretionary
government grants have a positive effect on the location decision of firms in the UK,
but that firms are less responsive in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their
industry. This suggests that subsidies are less effective in regions where there are limited





In 2003, the Flemish government set up an investment subsidy program aimed at small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)6 which was part of the general policy objective of
’increasing competitiveness of enterprises in Flanders’. The goal of the subsidy was to
financially support enterprises in making their investments in Flanders. The subsidy
was directed towards firms that have already ’earned their stripes in economic, ecologic
and employment terms’. In addition, the subsidy should stimulate innovative firms.7
Firms across virtually all sectors could apply. From this discussion, we infer that the
general goal of the subsidy was to stimulate growth for the best performing firms, which
was believed to increase the overall competitiveness of the economy.
To award the subsidy in an objective manner, the government introduced a ’call’
system,8 with a total of 16 calls from the year 2004 to 2009: the government calls for
applications until a pre-determined deadline, and then scores each application according
to a transparent process with pre-determined and openly communicated criteria. The
highest scoring applications get granted the subsidy, until the funds are depleted. Small
enterprises get a subsidy that is maximum 15% of the investment, while it is limited to
7.5% for medium sized firms. Later this was reduced to 10% and 5%. For regions in
Flanders marked as in need of economic support, the maxima were allowed to be 10%
higher. The investment can only be started after the submission deadline and needs to
be finished within 3 years after the subsidy decision date. The investment should be
minimum AC12.5K (AC25K for firms older than 5 years) and maximum AC8M. Applying is
costless but requires going through the administrative process of the application.9
6A small enterprise meets the following conditions: it has less than 50 employees, its yearly revenue
is lower than AC7M (AC10M from 2005 onwards) and its balance total is less than AC5M (AC10M from
2005 onwards), and is independent (less than 25% ownership by large companies). A medium sized
enterprise meets the following conditions: it has less than 250 employees, its yearly revenue is lower
than AC40M (AC50M from 2005 onwards) and its balance total is less than AC27M (AC43M from 2005
onwards), and is independent (less than 25% ownership by large companies).
7These policy goals are listed e.g. in the policy note of the Flemish minister of Economy at that time
Patricia Ceysens, see http://docs.vlaanderen.be/portaal/beleidsbrieven2007-2008/ceysens/
beleidsbrief_ceysens.pdf
8More background on this call system can be found in the document Ooghe and Spaenjers (2005).
9Banks offer to do the application process for the firm at a cost of AC350 per application, with an
extra fee of 7.5% of the subsidy if successful (minimum AC500 and maximum AC3500). Source: online
document of the firm ’Pylser boekhouding & fiscaliteit BVBA’.
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Each application was scored on 9 criteria relative to the other firms that applied,10
and for most of them the corresponding score is formula based. There were two broad
categories in these criteria: criteria based on the goals of the subsidy, set by the policy
maker (’policy criteria’) and criteria to favor better performing companies (’company
performance criteria’). The policy criteria were the following (+ indicates that higher
is better, - indicates that lower is better): the requested subsidy as a percentage of
investment vs the maximal allowed subsidy percentage (-), the degree of ’sustainable
entrepreneurship’ (+, proxied by whether the firm had a sustainability certificate), the
ICT level of the firm (+, proxied by whether the firm has a website or not), the age
of the firm (-) and the employment evolution of the firm (+, from 3 years before the
application to 1 year before the application). The company performance criteria were
the following: auto-financing of the project (+, the proportion of the investment the
firm will finance with its own means), the cash flow of the firm relative to total assets
(+), the gross value added per employee (+) and the ratio of the gross wage bill and
value added of the firm (-). The scores on the different categories are then re-scaled and
weighted11 to become comparable and summed to yield the total score. Further details
on how the score for each application is determined can be found in online appendix A.
Firms can apply multiple times. They can re-apply with the same project if their
application is unsuccessful, and they can always re-apply with a new project, independent
of whether they already received the subsidy. The data section discusses this more
extensively, and provides an overview of the re-applications. The section also provides
an overview of the different calls and corresponding summary statistics.
Note that the setup of the system is different from other investment subsidy programs.
These often include requirements trying to avoid subsidizing investments that would
have occurred as well without the subsidy and to mitigate the negative substitution
effect on employment. For example, the Italian policy scheme studied by Cerqua and
Pellegrini (2014) included the new job creation by unit of investment as a criterion.
For the RSA investment subsidies, researched by Criscuolo et al. (2012), the formal
criteria stipulated that the project (a) should be expected to lead to the creation of new
employment or directly protect jobs of existing workers which would otherwise be lost
and (b) would not have occurred in the absence of government funding. Such criteria
10Since the call of 3 June 2005 (decision date) the criterion ’requested subsidy as a % of investment
vs max allowed limit’ was dropped. In addition, since the call of 15 September 2006 the criterion ’ratio
gross wage bill and value added’ was dropped.
11See online appendix A on the subsidy for details on the scaling.
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are clearly not present in the Flemish investment subsidies. On top of this, the selection
criteria tend to target the most successful firms, less likely to be credit constrained.
Therefore we would expect the subsidy to have a smaller impact on firm growth and
employment compared to other programs. We will turn back to this issue in section 6.2.
3 Data description
3.1 Data description and summary statistics for the subsidy
data
This subsection provides a description of the subsidy data, an overview of the different
calls, and the summary statistics on the subsidy data.
The Entrepreneurship Agency,12 a department of the Flemish government, provided
us with the data on the subsidy. The data contain all firms that applied for the growth
subsidy,13 and provide information on whether the firm received the subsidy, the amount
of subsidy requested, the planned investment, the sub-scores on the different criteria
and the total score of the firm. The data also contain a firm identifier that allows us to
merge the data with the accounting data (see next subsection on the merging).
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the scores for the largest call in terms of
number of applications (2nd call). The vertical line in the graph shows the cut off: all
applications with a lower score are rejected, and all applications with a higher score are
accepted.
For a summary of the acceptance rate of awarding the subsidy, see Table 1. The
table shows that about 18% of the applications were granted the requested subsidy.
Because firms can re-apply if the subsidy is rejected, the acceptance rate is higher in
terms of number of firms: about 27%. The following numbers (not shown in the table)
illustrate the multiple applications per firm further. Of the 9161 firms that applied,
56% applied once, 30% applied twice and 14% applied three or more times. When an
application is rejected, firms can re-apply in a future call with the same project. Of the
16148 applications, 24% are re-applications of projects that were rejected in preceding
calls. Firms that are granted the subsidy, can also re-apply with new projects. Of the
2437 firms that received the subsidy, 14% received it multiple times, of which 10% (of
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Figure 1: Density of the scores for the largest call in terms of number of applications.
(2nd call, decision date March 3, 2005)
Footnote: The vertical dashed line indicates the acceptance cut off.
the total number of firms that received the subsidy) two times and 4% more than two
times. In theory, it was possible to apply with multiple projects in the same call, but
only 6 firms did this.
To perform the econometric analysis, we need to mitigate the issue of firms that apply
more than once. We do this by keeping only 1 application per firm. The application
we keep is selected in the following way. For rejected firms, we keep only the best
application.14 If a firm has a successful application and one or more unsuccessful
applications, we keep only the first successful application of the firm.15 Also if the firm
receives the subsidy multiple times, we keep only the first successful application.16 This
reduces the number of applications from 16148 to 9161 (= the number of firms). These
14’Best application’ is defined as closest to the acceptance cut off. This drops 4701 applications or
29% of the original 16018 applications that remain after basic datacleaning (dropping observations with
missing vat number or missing/erroneous entries for the subsidy amount or total investment amount).
15This additionally drops 1689 applications, or 11% of the original 16018 applications
16This additionally drops 479 applications, or 3% of the original 16018 applications.
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Table 1: Overview all calls
Total Accepted Rejected
Applications 16148 2966 13182
(%) 18 82
Firms 9161 2452 6709
(%) 27 73
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There
were 16 calls for submission of application, the first
was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009.
choices do not affect the results qualitatively.17
Table 2 provides an overview of the different calls and corresponding summary
statistics. We see that each call has a budget of AC12M to AC30M. The total subsidy
granted across the different years was almost AC250M. Between 14 and 28% of the
applications are rewarded a subsidy, depending on the call. The last four columns show
respectively the total amount of granted subsidies, the total investment corresponding to
the granted subsidies, the total amount of requested subsidies and the total investment
corresponding to all the projects requesting subsidy.
See Table 3 for summary statistics on the subsidy data and the corresponding
investment. The table shows that the average subsidy is about AC80K. The subsidy
ranges from about AC7K for the 10th percentile to about AC200K for the 90th percentile.
The corresponding investment amout is about AC900K on average, ranging from AC85K
(10th percentile) to about AC2.2M (90th percentile). The subsidy generally covers about
10% of the investment. There are some differences between the firms that receive the
subsidy and the firms that do not, but they are rather limited.
17The main results are robust to only keeping the first application of the firms that never received
the subsidy instead of keeping the best application, or dropping all firms that received the subsidy and
ever got rejected instead of only dropping the unsuccessful applications of these firms.
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Table 2: Overview per call
Index Decision Application # appl. # acc. % Tot. appr. Tot. inv. appr. Tot. req. Tot. req.
call date deadline appl. acc. subs. (ACM) subs. (ACM) subs. (ACM) inv. (ACM)
1 2-Jul-04 31-Mar-04 1410 391 28 30 275 122 1090
2 3-Mar-05 31-Dec-04 1893 443 23 30 331 137 1430
3 3-Jun-05 31-Mar-05 1202 165 14 12 153 84 1030
4 15-Sep-05 30-Jun-05 976 201 21 12 136 66 788
5 2-Dec-05 30-Sep-05 994 188 19 12 135 67 797
6 10-Mar-06 23-Dec-05 1022 134 13 12 125 73 852
7 6-Jun-06 31-Mar-06 1232 153 12 12 136 89 1040
8 15-Sep-06 30-Jun-06 988 141 14 12 140 71 842
9 14-Dec-06 29-Sep-06 761 126 17 12 131 58 673
10 20-Apr-07 22-Dec-06 788 125 16 12 132 66 756
11 23-Jul-07 30-Apr-07 764 148 19 16 185 66 787
12 7-Dec-07 31-Aug-07 813 197 24 16 196 62 740
13 21-Apr-08 21-Dec-07 878 178 20 16 204 72 880
14 29-Jul-08 30-Apr-08 890 123 14 16 179 77 903
15 24-Nov-08 31-Jul-08 687 126 18 16 203 65 796
16 15-Apr-09 24-Dec-08 850 127 15 16 168 76 909
Total 16148 2966 18 249 2829 1250 14313
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of application,
the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009. Firms can apply again with the
same project if rejected.
b The columns refer respectively to the call index, the decision date, the application date, the
number of applications, the number of accepted applications, the percentage of accepted
applications, the total approved subsidy, the total investment linked to the approved subsidy, the
total requested subsidy and the total investment linked to the requested subsidy.
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Table 3: Subsidy and investment summary statistics
N mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Requested subsidy amount No subs. 13182 76 107 7 16 39 90 188
(in 1,000AC) Subsidy 2966 84 138 5 14 33 89 234
Total 16148 77 113 7 16 38 90 193
Planned total investment No subs. 13182 871 1,231 92 195 435 1,000 2,114
(in 1,000AC) Subsidy 2939 968 1,598 55 149 350 996 2,642
Total 16121 889 1,306 85 180 417 1,000 2,200
Subsidy fraction of investment No subs. 13182 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
(-) Subsidy 2939 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.15
Total 16121 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of application,
the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009.
b The ’No subsidy’ rows refer to firms that applied but were not granted the subsidy, the
’Subsidy’ rows refer to firms that applied successfully for the subsidy, and the ’Total’ rows refer
to both groups, i.e. all firms that applied.
c We do not have the total investment for some of the firms that received the subsidy, therefore
the number of observations is slightly smaller for ’planned total investment’ and ’subsidy
fraction of investment’.
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3.2 Merge with the accounting data and pre-subsidy summary
statistics
To investigate the impact of the subsidy on various variables of interest, i.e. employment,
sales, total fixed assets and labor productivity, we need to merge the subsidy data with the
accounting data, obtained from the Bel-First database. This database, commercialized
by Bureau Van Dijck, includes information about all Belgian firms that need to file
annually an income statement and balance sheet. These are all Belgian enterprises
with the exclusion of one-man businesses. The accounting data goes from 2001 (3 years
before the first subsidies were awarded in 2004) to 2012 (3 years after the last subsidies
were awarded in 2009). The firm identifier allows us to merge the subsidy data with
the accounting data. As a substantial part of the firms that apply for the subsidy are
one-man businesses, we cannot match all firms. Of the 9149 that applied for a subsidy,
only 6092 have filed accounting information for at least one of the years of the period
considered, and only 4931 file an accounting statement for all years going from one
year before the subsidy decision to three years after the subsidy decision. We applied
standard datacleaning on our sample, see online appendix B for more details. Our
results therefore only apply to SMEs that are not one-man businesses.
The summary statistics on the accounting variables of our sample of firms are shown
in Table 4 for the year before the subsidy on the following variables: employment, fixed
assets,18 sales, value added, labor productivity (value added per worker) and age of
the firm. The firms that were awarded a subsidy are larger (in terms of employment,
fixed assets, sales and value added), more productive and younger. We report the same
summaries for the subsample of firms that is close to the cut off in in online appendix
C. More precisely, we report focus on firms for which the score is less than 1/3 of a
standard deviation away from the cut off value. As expected, the differences between
subsidized and non-subsidized firms become smaller.19 In section 5.1, we discuss the
pre-subsidy differences in more detail.
18The accounting system allows for four categories of fixed assets: start up costs, intangible fixed
assets, tangible fixed assets and financial fixed assets. The subsidy can only impact intangible and
tangible assets. Depreciation and amortization, used to calculate gross investment, refers to fixed assets
without the financial fixed assets. Thus, we define ’fixed assets’ as fixed assets minus financial fixed
assets, as the latter are not included in the subsidy nor impacted by depreciation. Thus, when we
use the term (total) fixed assets in the remainder of the text, we actually refer to fixed assets minus
financial fixed assets.
19These differences, except for value added, turn out to be insignificant when regressing the indicator
on a subsidy dummy together with call dummies.
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Table 4: Accounting data summary statistics in the year before the subsidy approval
decision
N mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Employment No subs. 4463 16 23 2 4 8 19 38
(in FTEs) Subsidy 932 25 35 1 3 10 33 62
Total 5395 18 26 2 4 9 21 42
Fixed assets No subs. 4463 716 1135 65 160 378 814 1640
(in AC1000) Subsidy 932 1299 2562 61 160 459 1393 3053
Total 5395 817 1499 64 160 388 871 1890
Sales No subs. 4407 4866 29768 452 859 2030 4900 10384
(in AC1000) Subsidy 913 6042 9173 415 847 2454 6893 17595
Total 5320 5068 27362 444 858 2065 5299 11216
Value added No subs. 4450 1014 1424 139 252 539 1197 2296
(in AC1000) Subsidy 926 1778 2505 107 247 814 2219 4568
Total 5376 1145 1685 134 251 561 1326 2683
Value added per worker No subs. 4450 60 33 33 42 53 69 94
(in AC1000/FTE) Subsidy 926 79 109 30 43 58 84 122
Total 5376 64 55 33 42 54 72 100
Age No subs. 4411 18 13 5 9 15 23 34
(in years) Subsidy 904 12 11 2 3 9 17 28
Total 5315 17 13 4 7 14 22 34
a Numbers are for the full period of the subsidy. There were 16 calls for submission of
application, the first was decided in July 2004 and the last in April 2009.
4 Methodology
Our methodology is based on the regression discontinuity design (RDD) insights. Due
to the set up of the subsidy score system, we have a sharp ’regression discontinuity’ in
our data: firms that have a score just below the cut off do not get a subsidy, while firms
just above the cut off do get the full requested subsidy. Therefore we can use the RDD
methodologies as set out in Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Angrist and Pischke (2008).
The main assumption is that firms just below the cut off are the best control group for
firms just above the cut off.
We define a dummy Dsubsi which takes on the value 1 if the score of the firm (sci) is
above the cut off score for awarding the subsidy (scco), which means that the firm gets
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the subsidy, and 0 if the score of the firm is below the cut off score for awarding the
subsidy, which means that the firm does not get the subsidy. Formally, we can write:
Dsubsi =
1 if sci ≥ scco0 if sci < scco. (1)
Figure 2: Density of the scores for the largest call in terms of number of applications,
limiting the observations to the zone around the cut off.
Footnote: The black vertical dashed line indicates the acceptance cut off, the grey vertical dashed lines
indicate the zone around the cut off that we consider to estimate the causal effect. The dashed lines
furthest from the cut off correspond to a distance from the cut off of one standard deviation of the
score variable, while the closest lines correspond to a distance of 1/4 of the standard deviation.
To estimate the impact of the subsidy, we pool the data over the different calls
and we use the cumulative four year growth from the year before the subsidy to three
years after the subsidy as a dependent variable. Hereby, we use five different types of
specification. First, as a benchmark, we start with a simple diff-in-diff comparison of
the evolution of say employment of all firms that received the subsidy vs the firms that
17




− 1 = σDsubsi + λcall + δsect + i, (2)
where ∆4Yi represents the (cumulative) growth in the variable of interest yi,t, e.g.
employment, three years after the subsidy call decision date (’3’) relative to the year
before the subsidy call decision date (’-1’). λcall is the dummy for the call in which
the firm participated, δsect controls for sector-specific evolutions.
20 We do not need to
add time dummies, as time effects are already taken up by the call dummies. This
specification will simply show that firms that did get the subsidy indeed experienced a
higher employment growth than firms that did not get the subsidy. The results do not
have a causal interpretation yet, as firms were selected on variables that increase the
likelihood of employment growth, e.g. past employment growth.
In the subsequent specifications, we do estimate a causal effect by controlling for the
selection of firms that received the subsidy. In the second specification, we do this by
adding a third order polynomial21 of the score to control for the selection effect fc(sci)
on the dependent variable. Because the subsidy program consisted of multiple calls, we
include a different polynomial for each call c and we run the following regression:
∆4Yi = σD
subs





i + δsect + i. (3)
As a more flexible variation of the above specification, we allow the call specific
polynomial22 to be different on both sides of the ’treatment’, as advised in Lee and









ck (sci − scco)k + (1−Dsubsi )βDi=0ck (sci − scco)k
]
+ λcall + δsect + i. (4)
20We define a total of 12 aggregated sectors based on the broad structure of the NACE rev2
classification. We do not pursue a narrower sector definition because of the limited number of
observations in the data.
21A higher order polynomial is used to take into account possible non-linearities. Increasing the order
does not have an impact on the results, but we prefer to limit the number of terms to avoid over-fitting.
22We reduced the polynomial to a second order polynomial to avoid over-fitting. Note that even then,
the number of polynomial parameters to be estimated increases by one compared to the ’normal’ third
order polynomial, as we estimate a different second order polynomial on both sides of the treatment.
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This allows for a more precise estimation of the function fc(sci) around the cut off point.
Fourth, as a robustness check, we limit the sample to firms that are close to the cut
off as illustrated before in 2.23 This approach explicitly exploits the assumption that
firms just below the cut off score are the best control group for firms just above the cut
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i |sci ∈ [scco, scco + ∆]
]
−E [∆4Y 0i |sci ∈ [scco −∆, scco[] ,
where E [∆4Y
0
i |sci = scco] is the expected value of the variable of interest (e.g., employ-
ment growth) at the cut off score if the firm is not awarded the subsidy (indicated by
superscript ’0’).
For our last specification, we use a mix between the third and fourth specification: we
limit the sample to firms close to the cut off, and in addition control for a linear term24
in the score variable, that is allowed to be different on both sides of the treatment.
In addition to looking for an average effect, we will also look for a heterogeneous
effect across different firm sizes. To this end, we will use a linear log employment in full
time equivalents (FTE’s) interaction.25 The latter is done according to the following
23We limit the sample to firms that have a score that is 0.29 or less from the cut off score. The
number 0.29, which is 1/3 of the standard deviation of the score, balances two objectives: the lower we
take the distance to the cut off score, the more accurate all things equal, but it also implies that we
have less observations and therefore lose estimation precision. We report as well results for firms at
different distances from the cut off as a robustness check.
24Given the limited number of observations, we report in our base specification only the results with
a linear term. Remember that the polynomial should be allowed to differ across the 16 different calls
and across treatment groups. E.g. a specification with a 1st order polynomial requires an estimation of
the parameter of interest, 12 sector dummies, 64 polynomial parameters (16 calls × (1 linear term +1
call dummy) parameters for the polynomials × 2 treatment groups). These are already 77 parameters
with approximately 1000 observations. Given that we only keep observations close to the cut off, a
linear control should suffice. We report as well specifications with a higher order polynomial. However,
the Akaike information criterion indicates even that the specification without a control for the score is
preferred for observations close to the cut off.
25In our analysis we use employment input converted to full time equivalents, which expresses the






i + β logFTEi,−1 ·Dsubsi + ρ logFTEi,−1 + fc(sci) + λcall + δsect + i. (5)
5 Results
This section gives an overview of the results. The section is organized as follows:
subsection 5.1 discusses the pre-subsidy differences between the firms that received the
subsidies and firms that did not. Subsection 5.2 presents graphical evidence. Subsection
5.3 shows the results for investment and subsection 5.4 shows the results for different
measures of firm size (sales, value added and employment). Finally, subsection 5.5
presents the robustness checks.
5.1 Pre-subsidy differences
This subsection shows the differences between the firms that were granted the subsidy
and the firms that were rejected, at the time before the subsidy decision is taken, and
how our RDD approach eliminates these differences. To illustrate these differences, we
use only the observations in the year before the subsidy is allocated, and then run an
OLS regression of the dependent variable of interest on a (future) subsidy dummy, and
dummies to control for the sector and the call. The results are shown in Table 5 for the
variables that determine the application score.
The rows respectively show the differences for the subsidy as a percentage of the
maximum allowed subsidy (’subs/max’), the sustainability certificate dummy (’sust’), a
website dummy (’web’), the age of the firm in days (’age’),26 the cumulative relative
employment growth over two years (’∆ Emp’), the degree of autofinancing of the
investment (’Autof’), the value added per worker (’Lprod’), the cash flow over total
assets (’CF’) and the wage bill over value added (’ULC’, standing for unit labor cost).
As expected, the firms that receive the subsidy request a lower subsidy compared to
the maximum allowed, have a higher probability of having a sustainability certificate or
a website, are younger , experienced a higher past employment growth, had a higher
26The selection score for the age criterion was age in days, with the score decreasing with age. After
5 years there was a limit, from this age onwards the score was equal to the score value of an age of five
years. In the tables on the pre-subsidy differences regressions, we therefore set the age to 5 years from
5 years onwards.
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degree of autofinancing and performed better in terms of labor productivity, cash flow
and unit labor costs.27
Next, we control for the score by including a polynomial in the score (column 2),
which is allowed to be different on both sides of the cut off (column 3). We see that the
differences between treated and non-treated firms disappear or at least get substantially
reduced. The differences for autofinancing, webpage and sustainability remain significant.
However, for sustainability and autofincancing, the coefficients switch sign, so if these
would be driving the results, we would see the estimated impact of the subsidy to change
from specification to specification. Moreover, when we focus on firms that are close to
the threshold in columns (4) and (5) the differences disappear.28 We have executed
the same procedure for the sample of small firms (10 employees or less), and obtained
similar results.
In online appendix D we report the differences between subsidized and non-subsidized
firms in terms of employment, value added, sales and fixed assets. Again, the initial
differences between the two groups disappear once controlling for the score and narrowing
the sample to firms close to the cut off.
We perform as well a test to check whether the firms can manipulate the assignment
of the subsidies. In this case, we would observe a discontinuity in the assignment variable
at the value of the cut off. We used the test proposed by McCrary (2008) and find no
significant discontinuity in the distribution of the scores around the cut off (see Figure
D.1 in online appendix D). 29
27The number of observations varies across the different indicators due to data availability and
because some indicators were only used for a limited number of calls.
28There are no results for the sustainability indicator as there are not enough firms with a sustainability
certificate close to the threshold. (less than 1% of the firms has a certificate)
29Note moreover that at the moment of application, the cut off score was not known to the firms as
it depends on the scores of all firms as well as their requested subsidy amount. The large number of
applicants at each call makes collusion as well highly implausible.
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Table 5: Pre-subsidy differences between firms that received the subsidy and
firms that did not
All Firms 1/3 St. Dev.
No Control Poly Control 2 Sided Contr. No Control 2 Sided Contr.
(1) (2) (3) Obs (6) (5) Obs.
subs/max -0.126** 0.0518 0.0220 1494 -0.00448 0.0144 534
(0.018) (0.0314) (0.0358) (0.0253) (0.0430)
sust 0.0565** -0.0285** 0.0229** 5395 . . 1203
(0.0078) (0.00460) (0.00416) () ()
web 0.153** 0.0371+ 0.0760** 5395 0.000663 -0.0250 1203
(0.0127) (0.0207) (0.0249) (0.0171) (0.0277)
age -0.241 -0.00356 0.00796 5395 -0.0449* -0.0314 1203
(0.0164) (0.0201) (0.0242) (0.0180) (0.0270)
∆Emp 0.172** -0.00194 -0.0335 4531 0.0346 -0.0609 952
(0.0192) (0.0315) (0.0371) (0.0216) (0.0442)
Autof 0.165** -0.0898** -0.0581+ 5395 0.0366+ 0.0209 1203
(0.0134) (0.0267) (0.0328) (0.0216) (0.0399)
Lprod 0.0904** -0.0355 -0.0370 5375 0.0342 -0.00812 1198
(0.0162) (0.0314) (0.0393) (0.0255) (0.0485)
CF 0.0364** 0.0111+ 0.00257 5391 0.0231** 0.0101 1203
(0.00334) (0.00615) (0.00760) (0.00508) (0.00946)
ULC -0.0633** -0.0233 -0.0106 3174 -0.0418** -0.0424+ 904
(0.00876) (0.0167) (0.0198) (0.0134) (0.0244)
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b All models include call and sector dummies. Model 1 is for the full sample without
controlling for score. Model 2 includes a 3rd order polynomial in the score. Model 3
includes a 2nd order polynomial allowed to be different on both sides of the cut off. In
models 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable. Model 4 does not control for the score. Model 5 includes
a linear control in the score that is allowed to be different on both sides of the cut off.
c Dependent variable indicated in the row: the maximum allowed subsidy (’subs/max’),
the sustainability certificate dummy (’sust’), a website dummy (’web’), the log age of the
firm in days (’age’), the cumulative relative employment growth over two years (’∆
Emp’), the degree of autofinancing of the investment (’Autof’), the log value added per
worker (’Lprod’), the cash flow over total assets (’CF’) and the wage bill over value
added (’ULC’, standing for unit labor cost).
d subs/max and ULC are only used as a criterion for the score for a limited number of
calls. We only include observations for the calls where they are used.
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5.2 Graphical Evidence
We first present some graphical evidence on the effect of the subsidy on the main
variables of interest. To this end, we divide the standardized score variable in a number
of bins and compute the average value of each indicator within these bins. These average
values are plotted against the midpoint of the bin. Figure 3 presents the results of
this exercise for fixed assets growth, sales growth, value added growth and employment
growth.30 We also show the fit of a polynomial regression model, estimated separately
on each side of the cut off point, together with the 95% confidence intervals. At best,
these figures show a small impact of the subsidy on fixed assets, sales, value added and
employment growth.
When turning to a subsample of small firms however, here defined as firms with 10
or less employees in the year before the subsidy, the picture changes. Figure 4 shows
some first evidence of a positive effect of the subsidy on input and output growth. We
will formally test these differences between subsidized and non-subsidized firms in our
econometric framework in the following subsections.
30Results are displayed for observations within one standard deviation of the cut off. The bin size is
equal to 0.05. Similar results are obtained with different values for the bin size. To test for the width
of the bin, we follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) and use the idea that if the bins are narrow enough,
there should be no systematic relationship between the indicator and the score within each bin. We
test for this by adding a set of interactions between the bin dummies and the score to a regression of
the indicator on the bin dummies and testing whether the interactions are jointly significant. We do
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Figure 3: Effect of subsidy on main indicators
Footnote: Bin size is 0.05. Graph restricted to firms within one standard deviation from the cut off. A
local polynomial smooth is added to the graph together with its confidence interval. The p−value a test
for the interactions between the bin dummies and the score being jointly equal to zero in a regression of
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Figure 4: Effect of subsidy on main indicators, small firms
Footnote: Bin size is 0.05. Graph restricted to firms within one standard deviation from the cut off. A
local polynomial smooth is added to the graph together with its confidence interval. The p−value of test
for the interactions between the bin dummies and the score being jointly equal to zero in a regression of
the indicator on the bin dummies and these interactions is reported below each pane.
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5.3 Results for Investment
This subsection shows the results for various measures of investment. We first show
results for net investment, i.e. changes in fixed assets. Later, we also show results for
gross investment, taking into account depreciation and amortization. In Table 6 we
present the 5 different specifications as explained in the methodology section in the
columns. In the first column, as a benchmark, we show the difference in fixed asset
growth between firms that received the subsidy and firms that did not, as specified
in equation (2). Firms that received the subsidy had a cumulative growth that was
approximately 33 percentage points higher. In the next 4 columns however, we see
that there is little evidence for a causal effect. In the second column, we control for
a polynomial in the score that the firms were given in the call, which corresponds to
specification (3) in the methodology section. The effect becomes substantially smaller
and is no longer statistically significant from zero. The coefficient is smaller in the rest
of the columns and is never statistically significant. In the third column, we control for
a polynomial that can differ across treatment group, see specification (4). The fourth
column is a diff-in-diff comparison between firms that received the subsidy and firms
that did not receive the subsidy, but with the sample limited to firms that are close to
the subsidy approval cut off. The fifth column shows the results for the reduced sample,
but with a linear control for the score.
Table 6: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year fixed assets growth after receiving
the subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.330∗∗ 0.232 0.188 0.0954 0.0368
(0.0996) (0.189) (0.229) (0.150) (0.275)
Polynomial Control No 3rdOrd. 2ndOrd. No 1stOrd.
2 sides 2 sides
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.031 0.044 0.049 0.071 0.122
b Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation
relative to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable. All specifications include call and sector dummies
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Interestingly, we get a different picture when we allow for heterogeneous effects
according to the size of the firm. We interact the treatment with the size of the firm,
as explained in equation (5). The results are reported in Table 7. Focusing on the full
sample, fixed assets growth is higher for firms that received the subsidy, but the effect is
decreasing in the size of the firm, measured by the log of employees before the subsidy.
More precisely, from column (2), fixed assets growth increases by 54.5% points for firms
with one FTE in the year before the subsidy. This percentage drops by approximately
13.1% points for each increase in log FTE by 1, e.g. for the median employment before
the subsidy of 9, the total effect is reduced to approximately 25%. This heterogeneity is
size is in line with earlier results of Bronzini and Iachini (2014), Cerqua and Pellegrini
(2014) and Criscuolo et al. (2012).31
The estimated coefficients are of similar size across the last three columns, but they
lose their statistical significance when focusing only on the firms close to the cut off,
probably due to a loss in precision due to the lower sample size.
To facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude and the statistical significance of
the results, we present the results of column (2) graphically in figure 5. The graph
shows that the effect is positive but statistically significant only for the smallest firms:
for firms with more than 5 employees, the estimated effect is no longer statistically
significant at the 10% level. The estimated effect itself goes down to zero for firms with
64 employees. Note however that the 90th percentile of initial employment is equal to 62,
so the number of firms for which the impact of the subsidy is predicted to be negative is
limited and for no firm the predicted impact is significantly negative.32
Obviously, the choice of the bandwidth for the restricted sample, namely 1/3 of
a standard deviation is arbitrary so we checked the results for different values of this
bandwidth. More precisely, we ran the same regression where we keep only firms within
respectively 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 and 1/5 standard deviation of the score variable. For each
of the different bandwidths we include no polynomial, a first order and a second order
polynomial in the score. We also report the Akaike information criterion to test which
order of the polynomial is the most appropriate. The results are reported in Table E.1 in
online appendix E. The picture that emerges from these different specifications appears
to be robust against the choice of different bandwidths or polynomials. Note moreover
31We found similar results when doing a split sample and focusing only on small firms, instead of
working with an interaction term.
32Given the winsorization, the firms for which the point estimate is negative are in fact as well
out-of-sample.
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Table 7: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year fixed assets growth after receiving
the subsidy - interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 0.710∗∗ 0.545+ 0.599+ 0.572 0.533
(0.226) (0.284) (0.322) (0.388) (0.459)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.151∗ -0.131+ -0.115 -0.188 -0.196
(0.0741) (0.0752) (0.0764) (0.126) (0.126)
log(FTE) before -0.342∗∗ -0.344∗∗ -0.344∗∗ -0.315∗∗ -0.301∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0783) (0.0780)
Polynomial Control No 3rdOrd. 2ndOrd. No 1stOrd.
2 sides 2 sides
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.061 0.072 0.076 0.111 0.158
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
a Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to
the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
b The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In columns 4
and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the score
variable. All specifications include call and sector dummies
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Figure 5: Illustration of the heterogeneous effect on fixed asset growth with regards to
initial firm size.
Footnote: Firm size is captured by initial employment in logs. The black line represents the estimated
effect according to column 3 in Table 7, the gray dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval.
The variance of the effect is calculated according to the following formula: var( ∂∆4Yi
∂Dsubsi
) = var(σ) +
logFTE2i,−1var(β) + 2 logFTEi,−1cov(σ, β). The point estimate for the effect of the subsidy becomes
negative at 4.16 log initial employment, which corresponds to 64 employees.
We also analyzed gross investment, taking into account depreciation and amortization.
In Table 8 we report the results for cumulative gross investment from the year before
the subsidy to 3 years after the subsidy was awarded, relative to the initial fixed assets.
As for net investment, we do not find a general effect for gross investment across all
firm sizes (results not shown here). Table 8 shows the results for the size interaction
specification. All coefficients again have the same sign and order of magnitude (taking
into account the standard errors) across specifications and are statistically significant
except for the first one in column (5). Again, the different specifications with different
bandwidths are reported in Table E.1 in online appendix E and basically show a similar,
consistent picture.
Although the coefficients are not always statistically significant – especially for
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Table 8: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year gross investment after receiving the
subsidy - interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Dsubs 1.287∗∗ 0.972∗ 1.252∗∗ 1.089+ 1.016
(0.345) (0.429) (0.484) (0.588) (0.689)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.269∗ -0.248∗ -0.250∗ -0.339+ -0.351+
(0.114) (0.115) (0.116) (0.193) (0.191)
log(FTE) before -0.463∗∗ -0.467∗∗ -0.466∗∗ -0.468∗∗ -0.472∗∗
(0.0526) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.116) (0.116)
Polynomial Control No 3rdOrd. 2ndOrd. No 1stOrd.
2 sides 2 sides
Observations 4661 4661 4661 1072 1072
R2 0.058 0.071 0.076 0.129 0.175
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: log cumulative gross investment, aggregated over 4 years, starting from the year
the subsidy is awarded to 3 years after the decision year of the subsidy.
c The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In columns 4
and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the score
variable. All specifications include call and sector dummies.
net investment – the same picture shows across specifications: the subsidies had a
positive effect on investment for the smallest firms, but this effect rapidly declines with
increasing firm size. Shown separately, the lack of statistical significance in some of the
specifications might cast some doubt on the evidence, but the next subsection shows that
the evidence for other measures of firm growth, i.e. increase in sales, value added and
employment, is more robust. This suggests that the fact that some specifications do not
show statistically significant coefficients for investment, might be due to measurement
noise. Fixed assets is typically a rather complex and noisy variable, where the reporting
is influenced by the tax implications, i.e. the goal of the firm is not to report its fixed
assets as accurately as possible, but rather to minimize taxes paid.
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5.4 Results for Firm Growth
In addition to the effect on investment, we have also analyzed the effect on the other
variables of interest. More precisely, we estimate the impact of the subsidy on two
output related variables, namely value added and sales as well as on employment.
Table 9 displays the results. Again, we show results for the 5 different specifications,
allowing the effect do differ between different firm sizes. The first column shows that
firms receiving the subsidy witnessed higher sales and value added growth, and the effect
is larger for small firms. The causal impact of the subsidy is lower however, as controlling
for the score substantially reduces the estimated coefficient. For example, the estimated
sales growth for a firm with one employee is equal to 18.1% when controlling for the score
in column (2), down from 29.3% in column (1). The size heterogeneity in the estimated
impact for sales of column (2) is illustrated in figure 6. According to this specification,
the effect is no longer statistically significant for firms with 11 employees and becomes
zero for firms with approximately 45 employees. Again, the level of employment for
which the effect becomes significantly negative is out-of-sample. The results for columns
(3) to (5) are qualitatively similar. This effect remains highly statistically significant in
all specifications, even when looking at small subsample of firms close to the cut off.
Similar findings are found for value addded, namely a positive effect of the subsidy, but
only for the small firms. We again ran robustness checks varying the bandwidth and
the included polynomial. Results are reported in Table E.2 in online appendix E . The
finding of positive impact of the subsidy on sales and value added growth appears to be
robust for different values of the bandwidth as well as polynomial. Again, according to
the Akaike information criterion, the zero order polynomial specification is the preferred
one, except for the sample one standard deviation from the cut off.
The effect of the subsidy on employment growth is reported in the bottom pane of
Table 9. Again, the specifications indicate that there is a positive effect of the subsidy
on employment growth, but only for the small firms.33 We will see in Section 6.2
that the impact on employment is low relative to the cost of the subsidy, even for the
specifications where we find a significant positive effect on employment. Varying the
bandwidth and order of the polynomial gives similar results (bottom rows in Table
E.2 in online appendix E ) and the Akaike information criterion indicates that the
33In the last specification, the estimated effect becomes insignificant, but given the robustness if the
estimate over the other specifications, we continue with the assessment that there is a positive effect on
employment.
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specification without including a polynomial in the score is the preferred one.34 , 35
All in all the results show that there was a positive impact of the subsidy on firm
growth, either measured by output or inputs, but only for the small firms. This naturally
raises the question what the large firms do with the subsidy. In online appendix H , we
show tentative evidence that subsidized large firms witness an increase in profits in the
same order of magnitude as the subsidy. Apparently, large firms did not react to the
subsidy in terms of investment, employment or sales, but simply used the subsidies to
increase their profit.
34We checked as well whether there is an impact on the exit probability of firms, but failed to find a
significant effect.
35We checked whether the results changed when including other covariates such as initial value added
or initial sales, but found this not to be the case. We have also performed regressions comparing the
change in the average value of the indicator before and after the subsidy instead of 4-year cumulative
growth and found similar results.
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Table 9: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative four year sales growth - interaction with
initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Sales
Dsubs 0.293∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.240∗
(0.0460) (0.0592) (0.0679) (0.0789) (0.0953)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0562∗∗ -0.0476∗∗ -0.0410∗ -0.0698∗∗ -0.0650∗
(0.0160) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0268) (0.0272)
log(FTE) before -0.0578∗∗ -0.0622∗∗ -0.0622∗∗ -0.0485∗∗ -0.0510∗∗
(0.00701) (0.00716) (0.00716) (0.0163) (0.0165)
Observations 4529 4529 4529 1077 1077
R2 0.078 0.093 0.097 0.101 0.131
Value Added
Dsubs 0.419∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.257∗ 0.281∗
(0.0588) (0.0733) (0.0817) (0.102) (0.120)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0880∗∗ -0.0745∗∗ -0.0711∗∗ -0.0734∗ -0.0725∗
(0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0337) (0.0337)
log(FTE) before -0.125∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(0.00855) (0.00870) (0.00869) (0.0206) (0.0207)
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.109 0.126 0.129 0.143 0.175
Employment
Dsubs 0.413∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.168∗ 0.239∗ 0.103
(0.0591) (0.0741) (0.0822) (0.106) (0.125)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0744∗∗ -0.0594∗∗ -0.0583∗∗ -0.0560 -0.0429
(0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0346) (0.0350)
log(FTE) before -0.191∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.193∗∗
(0.00876) (0.00885) (0.00886) (0.0201) (0.0204)
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.189 0.210 0.217 0.213 0.256
Polynomial Control No 3rdOrd. 2ndOrd. No 1stOrd.
2 sides 2 sides
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: growth in indicator 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
c The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
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Figure 6: Illustration of the heterogeneous effect on sales growth with regards to initial
firm size.
Footnote: Firm size is captured by initial employment in logs. The black line represents the esti-
mated effect according to column 2 of Table 9, the gray dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence
interval.The variance of the effect is calculated according to the following formula: var( ∂∆4Yi
∂Dsubsi
) =
var(σ) + logFTE2i,−1var(β) + 2 logFTEi,−1cov(σ, β). The point estimate for the effect of the subsidy
becomes negative at 3.80 log initial employment, which corresponds to 45 employees.
5.5 Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we estimate the impact of the subsidy
using local linear regression, secondly we estimate the effect for each call separately and
lastly we control for differences in the amount of the subsidy received.
5.5.1 Local Linear Regression
As a first robustness check, we apply a local linear regression to estimate the effect of the
subsidy on our main variables of interest (see Hahn et al., 2001). Our empirical strategy
above reflects the rationale behind local linear regression by restricting the sample to
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firms closer and closer to the cut off, so estimating for smaller and smaller bandwidths.
The main difference in this subsection is that we now use a triangle kernel and determine
the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011).36 The results are
reported in Table 10. We report results for different values of the bandwidth, namely
of 75%, 100% and 150% of the optimal bandwidth. To allow for heterogeneity in the
effect for different sizes of the firms, we report as well results for the subsample of small
firms, i.e. firms with 10 or less employees before receiving the subsidy. The results
are consistent with the main findings of the previous section. While we do not find an
effect for the full sample, we find a positive and significant effect of the subsidy for each
indicator in the subsample of small firms, although for employment the effect is only
significant at the 10% level.
5.5.2 Estimation per Call
As a second robustness check we estimate the effect of the subsidy for each call separately
instead of pooling the observations and running the regressions with call dummies and
call specific controls for the score. We subsequently compute the aggregate effects by
taking a weighted average of the call specific estimates. We use two different weighting
schemes, following Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014). First, we give more weight to the



















with βc the coefficient estimate of call c and σc its standard error.












36We first standardize the score before including it in the local linear regression. We used the rd
module in stata to execute this analysis. (Nichols, 2011)
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Table 10: Local linear regression with triangle kernel
Fixed Assets Employment Sales Value Added
All Firms
Bandwidth 100% 0.1462 0.0512 0.0858 0.0801
(0.212) (0.0612) (0.0537) (0.0604)
Bandwidth 75% 0.1564 0.0579 0.1057+ 0.1015
(0.2423) (0.0682) (0.0604) (0.0676)
Bandwidth 150% 0.1789 0.0318 0.0534 0.0606
(0.1808) (0.0517) (0.0458) (0.0513)
Bandwidth 1.091 0.8253 0.6866 0.924
Small Firms
Bandwidth 100% 0.5894+ 0.1643+ 0.1389∗ 0.2093∗
(0.3536) (0.0983) (0.0700) (0.0974)
Bandwidth 75% 0.5893 0.1921+ 0.1568∗ 0.2336∗
(0.4048) (0.113) (0.0789) (0.1104)
Bandwidth 150% 0.6208∗ 0.1542+ 0.1424∗ 0.1707∗
(0.2991) (0.0836) (0.0605) (0.0835)
Bandwidth 1.3303 1.1594 1.2609 1.086
a Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: growth in employment 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
c Local linear regression using a triangle kernel
The results where we use the inverse of the variance as weights are presented in Table
11. Online appendix F reports the findings for applying the number of observations.
The findings are in line with the previously reported results, namely a positive effect of
the subsidy on firm growth, but only for the small firms.
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Table 11: Estimations for each call separately
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Firms All Firms All Firms Close Firms Close Firms
Fixed Assets
Dsubs 0.6001∗∗ 0.5011+ 0.3158 0.5897∗ 0.3752
(0.2233) (0.2764) (0.2809) (0.2654) (0.3796)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.1099 -0.1065 -0.0798 -0.0362 -0.0103
(0.0721) (0.0723) (0.0719) (0.0849) (0.0893)
log(FTE) before -0.3409∗∗ -0.3407∗∗ -0.336∗∗ -0.0849 -0.0325
(0.035) (0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0521) (0.0384)
Sales
Dsubs 0.2769∗∗ 0.1874∗∗ 0.1394∗ 0.2623∗∗ 0.187+
(0.0454) (0.0583) (0.0622) (0.0777) (0.0994)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0473∗∗ -0.0362∗ -0.0315+ -0.0429 -0.0508+
(0.016) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0273) (0.0281)
log(FTE) before -0.0607∗∗ -0.0664∗∗ -0.0669∗∗ -0.0370∗ -0.0319∗
(0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0162) (0.0159)
Value Added
Dsubs 0.4132∗∗ 0.2571∗∗ 0.2163∗∗ 0.1346 0.1218
(0.0589) (0.0731) (0.0756) (0.099) (0.1236)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0862∗∗ -0.0721∗∗ -0.0638∗∗ -0.024 -0.0314
(0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0341) (0.0349)
log(FTE) before -0.1259∗∗ -0.1316∗∗ -0.1318∗∗ -0.1063∗∗ -0.1065∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0199) (0.0203)
Employment
Dsubs 0.4223∗∗ 0.2234∗∗ 0.2128∗∗ 0.2979∗∗ 0.0883
(0.0574) (0.0711) (0.073) (0.099) (0.1172)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0777∗∗ -0.0599∗∗ -0.0545∗∗ -0.0556+ -0.0504
(0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0337) (0.0338)
log(FTE) before -0.193∗∗ -0.2013∗∗ -0.2021∗∗ -0.1648∗∗ -0.1663∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0187) (0.0190)
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: growth in indicator 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
c The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In
columns 4 and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard
deviation of the score variable.
d Equations estimated per call and estimates aggregated up using the inverse of the variance as
weights.
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5.5.3 Subsidy Amount Relative to Size
A possible explanation for the heterogeneity in size is that smaller firms simply receive
a higher subsidy relative to their size. If the same amount of subsidy is given to a small
and a large firm, the former is likely to experience a higher boost thanks to the subsidy.
In our data, we see that smaller firms indeed received a higher subsidy relative to their
size: if we regress the log of the subsidy amount on the log initial employment of the
firms that received the subsidy, we find that a 10% increase in employment implies only
a 3 to 4% increase in the subsidy amount. To check if this explains our results, we used
a continuous measure of subsidy relative to firm size rather than the simple dummy
Dsubs. More specifically, we used the subsidy amount relative to the initial employment
of the firm in the year before the subsidy was awarded. We check whether the impact
of the subsidy amount per employee is lower for large firms compared to small firms by
including the interaction between initial employment and the relative subsidy amount.
If we again find the interaction to be negative, the lower impact of receiving the subsidy
for large firms is not entirely due to a lower subsidy amount per employee. There is an
additional complication in the empirical specification: the RDD methodology controls
for the non-random subsidy decision by the government, but the requested subsidy
amount by the firm could still be endogenous, i.e. firms requesting a higher subsidy
amount are more likely to invest more. Consequently simply regressing the outcome
on the continuous subsidy measure could create an upward bias in the estimate for
the impact of the subsidy. However, for our purposes, we are mostly interested in the
coefficient on the interaction between initial employment and the received subsidy and
endogeneity will only drive this estimate when there is a difference in the endogeneity
bias between small and large firms.37 The results for the cumulative growth in fixed
assets are shown in Table 12 and for sales in Table 13. In Table 12 we see qualitatively
a similar picture as before: the effect is highest for the smallest firms and decreases with
firm size. The statistical significance is lower, but this is not surprising.38 We added an
37We also included the amount of requested subsidies next to the received subsidies in the regression
equation. The idea is that the requested subsidies could control for the endogeneity issue by picking up
the relation between the requested subsidies and the planned size of the investment, thereby affecting
firm growth. The results of including this extra control are highly similar to the one reported in the
paper.
38The statistical significance will likely drop due to two reasons. First, estimating a continuous effect
is more data-demanding than estimating the coefficient of the simple dummy Dsubs in the baseline
specification. Second, the applications for firms that receive the subsidy multiple times are not taken
into account, possibly underestimating the subsidy amount received and thus introducing measurement
error.
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additional symbol # in the table to indicate that the coefficients are significant at the
20% significance level. The results in Table 13 for sales are in line with these results,
but the coefficients here are statistically significant at the traditional significance levels.
Moreover, the results are consistent with the previous results in terms of magnitude.
The results for value added and employment are in line with the results for sales and
are omitted to save space. All in all, the results indicate that the different impact of the
subsidy according to firm size is not (entirely) due to differences in the relative subsidy
amount. This is consistent with for example the findings of Bronzini and Iachini (2014)
who provide evidence for the greater effect of R&D subsidies on small firms being due
to financial frictions.
Table 12: Effect of the subsidy intensity on cumulative four year fixed assets growth after
receiving the subsidy - interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
log(subs/FTE) 0.0856∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.0797+ 0.109∗
(0.0245) (0.0296) (0.0322) (0.0420) (0.0483)
log(FTE)bef.× log(subs/FTE) -0.0139# -0.0103 -0.00765 -0.0220# -0.0213#
(0.00876) (0.00886) (0.00891) (0.0146) (0.0143)
log(FTE) before -0.341∗∗ -0.341∗∗ -0.340∗∗ -0.308∗∗ -0.290∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0772) (0.0771)
Observations 4857 4857 4857 1112 1112
R2 0.063 0.075 0.080 0.114 0.162
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. # p < 0.20, + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
c The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In columns 4
and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the score
variable.
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Table 13: Effect of the subsidy intensity on cumulative four year sales growth after receiving
the subsidy - interaction with initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
log(subs/FTE) 0.0302∗∗ 0.0206∗∗ 0.0180∗∗ 0.0281∗∗ 0.0299∗∗
(0.00489) (0.00608) (0.00683) (0.00849) (0.00987)
log(FTE)bef.× log(subs/FTE) -0.00477∗ -0.00453∗ -0.00393∗ -0.00704∗ -0.00666∗
(0.00187) (0.00191) (0.00195) (0.00308) (0.00310)
log(FTE) before -0.0581∗∗ -0.0626∗∗ -0.0626∗∗ -0.0491∗∗ -0.0502∗∗
(0.00699) (0.00714) (0.00714) (0.0162) (0.0164)
Observations 4529 4529 4529 1077 1077
R2 0.078 0.094 0.097 0.103 0.133
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. # p < 0.20, + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: cumulative growth in fixed assets 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’)
c The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In columns 4
and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the score
variable. All specifications include call and sector dummies.
6 Additional Results
The current section presents some additional results, namely we first measure the impact
of the subsidy on productivity and second, we assess the cost effectiveness of the subsidy
by calculating the cost per job created.
6.1 Impact on productivity
This subsection shows the results for productivity. The analysis is complicated by the
fact that the very small firms (micro-firms), namely firms with only 1 or 2 employees,
are exceptionally productive.39 The main explanation we see is that the owner of the
firm is not always reported as an employee of the firm, even if active in the firm.40
39For example, in terms of labor productivity, firms with one employee are approximately 60% more
productive than firms with more than 3 employees. For firms with 2 and 3 employees these premia are
respectively approximately 28% and 13%.
40The owner is at least partly paid through the profits of the firm. Some owners choose to be an
employee of their firm, e.g. for tax reasons (if they pay themselves a low wage, the tax rate on their
wage is lower than the corporate taxes), but not all owners do this. We see for instance many firms
reporting zero employment in their accounting statements.
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This creates a positive measurement bias of labor productivity for small firms, which
is more severe the lower the number of FTE’s. An alternative explanation is that the
marginal product of the employees diminishes with each extra employee that the firm
hires. Irrespective of the reason way micro-firms are more productive and increasingly
so the smaller they are, this is potentially problematic in the context of this paper as we
found evidence that the subsidy increased employment for the very small firms. Hence,
we need to control for this in our analysis.
We mitigate this problem in two ways: in our main specification, we use detailed
controls for firm employment.41 As a robustness check, we run the analysis again
with labor productivity calculated as value added per ’FTE plus 1’. The results are
qualitatively the same.42
The results for the cumulative growth, i.e. the growth in labor productivity 3
years after the subsidy allocation relative to the year before the subsidy (year ’-1’),
are shown in the upper pane of Table 14. The first column again shows that a simple
comparison shows that firms that received the subsidy experienced a higher growth in
labor productivity. When estimating the effect in the next 4 columns, we find a positive
effect for the smallest firms that decreases with increasing firm size.
Next, we estimate the effect on TFP by running similar regressions, still with labor
productivity as a dependent variable, but controlling for fixed assets, which controls
for the fact that labor productivity could be systematically higher for firms that use
more capital. The results are shown in Table 14. We see qualitatively the same results
as before, although the significance level drops somewhat. We can conclude that the
subsidy had an impact on productivity of small firms, both on labor productivity and
TFP.
41More specifically, we add separate dummies for a FTE of respectively one, two and three. We also
add log FTE as a general control for the number of FTE’s. The details on the exact implementation
are explained in online appendix G.
42The results for this robustness check are available on request.
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Table 14: Effect of the subsidy on cumulative labor productivity growth - interaction with
initial log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms All firms All firms Close firms Close firms
Labor Productivity
Dsubs 0.137∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.103∗ 0.0850 0.136∗
(0.0324) (0.0397) (0.0456) (0.0523) (0.0638)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0411∗∗ -0.0373∗∗ -0.0330∗∗ -0.0344∗ -0.0381∗
(0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0175) (0.0176)
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.148 0.160 0.164 0.141 0.162
Total Factor Productivity
Dsubs 0.117∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.0827+ 0.0726 0.121+
(0.0312) (0.0383) (0.0440) (0.0519) (0.0631)
log(FTE) before ×Dsubs -0.0361∗∗ -0.0329∗∗ -0.0289∗∗ -0.0299+ -0.0328+
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0173) (0.0174)
Observations 4828 4828 4828 1107 1107
R2 0.187 0.197 0.200 0.168 0.187
Polynomial Control No 3rdOrd. 2ndOrd. No 1stOrd.
2 sides 2 sides
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
b Dependent variable: growth in labor productivity 3 years after the subsidy allocation relative to the
year before the subsidy (year ’-1’). Labor productivity is defined as value added per FTE.
c The columns refer to the 5 different specifications explained in the methodology section. In columns 4
and 5, the sample is limited to firms close to the cut off, i.e. within 1/3 standard deviation of the score
variable. All specifications include call and sector dummies.
d The regressions also control for different productivity growth according to firm size, see appendix G for
a detailed description.
e The coefficients in the bottom pane can be interpreted as the effect on TFP because we control for
growth in fixed assets, see online appendix G for a detailed description.
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6.2 Subsidy per created job
The previous paragraphs show that we only find an effect on growth for the smallest
firms. However, from these results it is still difficult to judge how cost-efficient the
program was. To get a sense of the cost-efficiency and to be able to compare with
other studies, we calculate the subsidy amount per created job in the subsidized firms.
To this end, we take the RDD specifications in the last four columns of table 9, and
calculate the estimated growth in employment in the neighborhood of the cut off (i.e.,
we limit the sample to firms within 1/3 standard deviation of the score variable). E.g.
according to column 2 in table 9, firms with one FTE experience a growth of about 18%
in employment. So the estimated job growth for these firms is 0.18 jobs. For firms with
ten FTE’s, the estimated job growth is 0.41 jobs.43 For firms that experience a negative
employment growth due to the fitted model, we set the employment growth to zero.44
We aggregate these estimates in firm-level job growth to get the total job growth
in the neighbourhood of the cut off. Next, we also aggregate the subsidy amounts
corresponding to these firms. Of the 1112 firms we observe near the cut off (i.e. the
number of observations in columns 4 and 5), 410 firms get the subsidy. According to
the specification in column 2, the aggregate job growth due to the subsidy was about
78 jobs for these firms. The total amount of subsidy spent on these 410 firms is AC35M.
The estimated subsidy spent per created job in the subsidized firms is therefore about
AC450K according to this specification. If we take the average across the four RDD
specifications, column 2 to 5 in table 9, we find a number of AC488K, or almost AC500K.
The high cost is not solely driven by the fact that there is no employment effect for
the larger firms. Even if we limit the calculation to firms with ten FTE’s or less, the
estimated cost per job is AC189K, which is still high compared to the estimates in the
other papers.
Note that this measure does not take negative or positive spillovers to other firms
into account, neither the administrative cost for the government and the firms that
applied. Nonetheless, this number suggests that the program was an expensive way to
create jobs. Theoretically, this can be explained by firms substituting capital for labor
due to the lower costs of capital. The total effect on labor would then be a combination
of this negative substitution effect and a positive scale effect, i.e. firms generating
43Calculated as (0.178− 0.0594 · log(10)) · 10.
44Theoretically it is possible that a capital subsidy has a negative impact on employment growth.
However, given the previous results, it seems more likely that the larger firms simply did not invest
more due to the subsidy, and hence the effect on employment was also zero.
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more output. Other subsidy systems try to mitigate the substitution effect by adding a
criterion that the project should lead to the creation of new jobs and found substantially
lower costs.45 Note however that these are not the only differences with those subsidy
schemes, so it remains to be seen how much of the cost difference can be attributed to
this condition.
7 Conclusion
This paper determines the effect of investment subsidies granted in Flanders between
2004 and 2009. The goal of these subsidies was to financially support well performing
companies in their investment decisions, thereby stimulating growth and competitiveness.
We evaluate the impact of these subsidies on the outcomes for the firms receiving the
subsidy: growth in fixed assets, output, employment and productivity. Our paper is one
of the only papers to exploit a quasi-experimental setting in evaluating the effectiveness
of subsidies. The ranking system of the applications creates a sharp cut off, allowing us
to credibly estimate a causal effect around the subsidy cut off using RDD.
We find that the effect of the subsidies on the growth of the receiving firms was
rather limited. Only for the very small firms, we find a positive effect on investment,
employment, sales, value added and productivity. For larger firms, we do not find any
effect. The heterogeneous effect in terms of size confirms earlier results of Bronzini
and Iachini (2014), Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) and Criscuolo et al. (2012). Our
evidence suggests that larger firms use the subsidy to finance investments they would
have undertaken anyway.
The positive effect on growth is moreover limited, relative to the cost of the subsidy.
For example, we estimate the subsidy spending per created job to be AC500K. Given the
setup of the subsidy, this is not that surprising. First, the subsidy is aimed at firms
that have been well performing in the past and favors investments financed with a high
fraction of the firm’s own funds. Consequently, these firms are less likely to be credit
constrained and the subsidy is more likely to finance investment projects that would
have been executed as well in its absence. Second, the subsidy as a percentage of the
total investment was relatively low, having a more limited impact on the profitability
45Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014) estimate the same measure for Law 488 in Italy to be about AC62K/job.
Criscuolo et al. (2012) estimate a different measure for the RSA program in the UK, i.e. total jobs
created (using estimates at the area level rather than the firm level) over the total cost of the program
(including administrative costs and taxation). Their estimate is about AC6K/job.
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of the investment project. To avoid that the subsidy are mainly windfall gains to the
receiving firms, we would recommend to exclude certain criteria, especially the ones for
autofinancing and cash flow, as these go against one of the main rationales to grant
investment subsidies, namely enterprises being unable to execute a profitable investment
project because of credit constraints. Potentially, other criteria could be added such as
the new job creation and whether the investment would have occurred in the absence of
the government support. These led to for example in the UK and Italy to a substantially
higher cost effectiveness of investment subsidies (Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014; Criscuolo
et al., 2012).
In terms of competitiveness, it appears that the productivity of the subsidized firms
has increased in comparison to non-subsidized firms, but how this would translate in
growth in the long run is still an open research question that we leave for future research.
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